Pulse X1 security: closed by default, and checked

A router sits between your home or business and the internet. The X1 starts with every way in shut and opens only what you turn on. This page explains what that means and how we check it.

Why a router's security matters

Routers are always on, rarely looked at and often years behind on updates, which makes them a favourite target. In 2026, sixteen security agencies, CISA among them, warned that the covert networks used to hide attacks mostly consist of compromised home and small-office routers.

The FBI warns that routers past their end of life no longer get security updates, are being taken over for criminal networks, and should be replaced. FBI, end-of-life routers, PSA I-050725-PSA, 2025.

The Pulse X1 is built so that it is not that router. Here is how it compares, point by point.

TopicA typical routerPulse X1
Default passwordIn a 2024 study of 40 home routers, 18 did not make the owner set an admin or Wi‑Fi password, and some accepted “admin”, or no password at all, when setup was skipped. A 2022 study found hard-coded credentials in 21 of 109 firmware images.Ye et al., Exposed by Default, ACM AsiaCCS 2024; Fraunhofer FKIE, Home Router Security Report 2022No shared default. You choose your own password at the first sign-in, before any other screen opens, and one made from the unit's MAC address is refused.
Hidden ways inThe same 2024 study found an open but undocumented Telnet service on 2 routers and an undocumented SSH service on 4. Telnet logins with default passwords are how the Mirai botnet took over about 600,000 devices.Ye et al., Exposed by Default, ACM AsiaCCS 2024; Antonakakis et al., Understanding the Mirai Botnet, USENIX Security 2017No Telnet at all. SSH is off until you open a support window for 1 to 72 hours, on your own network, for Peppy Pulse's support keys only; it closes itself.
Signing inEvery one of the 40 routers in the 2024 study served its web interface over plain HTTP by default.Ye et al., Exposed by Default, ACM AsiaCCS 2024HTTPS only, with a certificate for each unit. After five wrong passwords each try waits twice as long, up to five minutes.
The web interfaceOS command injection tops MITRE's 2025 list of weaknesses exploited in the wild. By our reading of CISA's catalogue on 2026-11-18, it is behind about half of the exploited flaws listed for home and small-office routers.MITRE, 2025 CWE Top 10 KEV Weaknesses; CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogueThe web app cannot run a shell command at all. It reaches the router through 18 typed interfaces, each with a JSON Schema and its own permission.
UpdatesIn the 2024 study, 7 routers downloaded firmware over plain HTTP, so an attacker on the path could swap the file, and 12 could not update themselves at all.Ye et al., Exposed by Default, ACM AsiaCCS 2024Every update and every release list is signed with Ed25519 keys and fetched over HTTPS with no redirects. The X1 checks for updates every day, and an old list cannot be replayed to hide a newer one.
Age of the softwareIn a 2022 test of 122 routers, 93 of the 121 Linux kernels found no longer received official updates, about three in four.Fraunhofer FKIE, Home Router Security Report 2022Linux 6.12, a long-term support kernel, on OpenWrt 25.12, the current stable series.
Support and reportingRouters past their end of life stop getting security updates, and the FBI advises replacing them. Only about 4 in 10 makers of consumer connected devices give people a way to report a security flaw.FBI, end-of-life routers, PSA I-050725-PSA, 2025; IoT Security Foundation, State of Vulnerability Disclosure in Consumer IoT, 2025Security updates for seven years from launch, and a public address for reporting a flaw: security@peppypulse.com.

Nothing open that you did not open

Every way into the X1 is either closed or behind your own password and HTTPS.

Remote shell
No Telnet at all. SSH is off by default. You can open a support window for 1 to 72 hours, on your own network only and for Peppy Pulse's support keys only; it closes itself when the time is up. There are no shell passwords.
Passwords
No shared default. The X1 makes you choose your own password at the first sign-in, before any other screen opens, and refuses one derived from its MAC address.
Signing in
HTTPS only, with a certificate for each unit. After five wrong passwords, each further try waits twice as long, up to five minutes. Changing an account's password or role signs it out everywhere.
Accounts and roles
Several accounts, each with a role. Every area of the router has a separate view and manage permission, so a family member or a technician can see without changing.
Separate credentials
Web app accounts are not system users and cannot sign in over SSH or the console. The root account is locked.

A web app that cannot run commands

Command injection through a router's web interface is one of the most exploited flaws there is. The X1 removes the path it needs.

The web app is static files served by the router. Everything it can do goes through 18 typed interfaces, one per area: the modem, Wi‑Fi, the firewall, updates and so on. Each method has a JSON Schema, and each needs its own permission, checked on the router for every call.

None of those interfaces runs a shell command, and the web app is not allowed the router's generic command runner. The services behind it are OpenWrt's own, written in C and ucode; no Node.js runs on the router.

Updates you can check

An update is the moment a router is easiest to break, or to take over. This is what happens, in order, when an X1 installs one.

Check a download yourself
  1. The X1 reads the release list for its channel over HTTPS and follows no redirect.

    The list is signed. It names its channel and board, carries a serial that never goes down, and expires after 14 days, so nobody can replay an old list to hide a newer release. It is signed again every week.

  2. It downloads the update and checks its size, its SHA-256 and its own signature.

    Two Ed25519 keys sign different things. The build signs the image; a separate step that holds nothing else signs the update, so a compromised build machine cannot sign one. An offline backup key can still reach routers if the main key is ever lost.

  3. It installs into the other of its two firmware slots. The running slot is never written.

    Settings travel with the update. A power cut during the copy leaves the running version as it was.

  4. It restarts on the new version, on trial.

    The new version has to reach the internet, or an administrator has to sign in, within 10 minutes and three boots. Otherwise the X1 switches back to the previous version by itself, and its nightly automatic install skips that version from then on.

A current base

Old software collects known holes. The X1 runs software that is still maintained upstream.

Linux 6.12
A long-term support kernel, 64-bit on the X1's Arm cores.
OpenWrt 25.12
The current stable series of OpenWrt, tracked upstream.
Mainline modem drivers
The Linux kernel's own drivers with ModemManager, rather than an out-of-tree driver tied to one old kernel.
Radar checks kept
On 5 GHz channels shared with radar, regulators require a check before transmitting. The X1 always runs it, and radar channels are opt-in.
Builds you can trace
Built in a pinned container from a pinned OpenWrt release; each signed release comes with a software bill of materials.
Encrypted backups
Sealed with your passphrase (Argon2id and XChaCha20-Poly1305). A restore brings back only the settings the X1 manages, never private keys from another unit.

Built for the rules routers now face

Governments have started to write down what a connected product must not do. The X1 was designed with these in mind.

Unique passwords
The UK's product security regime and California's SB-327 require a password unique to each device or set by its owner. The X1 makes the owner set it.UK PSTI regime; California Civil Code 1798.91.04
Support period and reporting
The UK regime also asks for a published minimum support period and a way to report security problems, and the EU's Cyber Resilience Act sets at least five years of support. The X1 gets seven from launch, and reports go to security@peppypulse.com.UK PSTI regime; European Commission, Cyber Resilience Act
No default passwords
CISA asks makers to stop relying on customers to change default passwords. The X1 does not let a session go further until the password is changed.CISA Secure by Design alert, 2023
No command injection
CISA and the FBI ask makers to remove OS command injection by design. The X1's web app has no way to run a command.CISA Secure by Design alert, 2024

Seven years of updates, and a place to report

Security is not finished on the day a router ships.

Security updates
The Pulse X1 gets security updates for seven years from its launch. They arrive signed, install into the spare slot, and roll back by themselves if something goes wrong.
Report a problem
Found a security problem in the Pulse X1 or its firmware? Write to security@peppypulse.com with what you found and how to reproduce it, and give us time to fix it before you publish. The same address is in security.txt.

Reviewed and tested

Security work that is not checked tends to drift. The reviews are our own, each with a written report, and every finding is closed with a test that would catch it coming back.

8
internal security reviews since 2026-10-14, each with a written report; all 48 findings fixed, each with a test
18
typed router interfaces, each with a JSON Schema and its own permission
100%
unit-test coverage required of the web app, plus browser tests end to end
266
automated network checks in a VM testbed, over a public and an IPv6-only uplink
54
device checks over the router's own API, run on the X1 and in the VM

A router that is closed until you open it.

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